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NOTE
Foreign Exchange Sales and the Law of
Contracts: A Case For Analogy to the
Uniform Commerical Code
I. INTRODUCTION
The foreign exchange market' in the United States has ex-
panded dramatically in recent years. According to a market survey
by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the volume of foreign
exchange trading in the United States increased from a daily turn-
over of five billion dollars in April 1977 to twenty-three billion dol-
lars in March 1980.2 Prior to this period of growth, the foreign ex-
change market was remarkably free of litigation.' A bank's
reputation for fairness always has been important to other banks
and foreign exchange customers in this market in which verbal
telephone agreements govern transactions that often involve large
sums of money. When the parties make mistakes, they share the
loss rather than resort to legal action.4 The startling lack of case
law concerning miscarried foreign exchange deals supports Paul
Einzig's observation in 1966 that "[m]ost dealers with very long
experience have never had a single lawsuit arising from misunder-
standings in respect of foreign exchange transactions."5
An examination of the mechanics of foreign exchange transac-
tions reveals the necessity of each party's confidence in the relia-
bility of the other. The characteristics that create this need for
confidence, however, so invite human error that legal problems in-
evitably arise. Since exchange rates6 may fluctuate from minute to
1. Foreign exchange is the conversion of the currency of one country into that of an-
other. R. CONINX, FOREIGN EXCHANGE TODAY 9 (1978). A party seeking to convert a particu-
lar currency will use that currency to purchase the desired currency.
2. Revey, Evolution and Growth of the United States Foreign Exchange Market, FED.
RESERVE BANK N.Y.Q. REv., Autumn 1981, at 32.
3. P. EINZIG, A TEXTBOOK ON FOREIGN EXCHANGE 41 (1966).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. This Note adopts the method of rate quotation that expresses the number of for-
eign currency units equivalent to one United States dollar. This exchange rate is the quota-
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minute,7 the parties often make their deals over the telephone so
that a purchaser may take immediate advantage of a quoted rate.8
The parties agree verbally to the rate, the amount purchased, the
value date,9 and perhaps, the payment instructions.10 Upon the
close of the conversation the parties have entered into an oral con-
tract. The parties will mail or wire written confirmations of these
terms to each other,11 although one or both of the parties may take
steps toward settling the deal before receipt of a confirmation. 12
What happens then when one party receives the other's confirma-
tion of a different rate, a different amount, a different value date,
or a different transaction altogether? One foreign exchange author
writes, "There cannot be any market dealer anywhere who has
never done a deal 'the wrong way round', or for the wrong amount,
or the wrong value date, or some other major error at some time. '13
The inevitability of these mistakes and their potential cost,
given today's volatile exchange rates and the increasing volume of
foreign exchange, makes litigation arising from these transactions
much more likely than before. This Note briefly describes the for-
eign exchange market and explains simple versions of certain kinds
tion method used in the European market and, since 1978, in the United States market.
Revey, supra note 2, at 42.
7. For example, the exchange rate for the German mark underwent an average daily
fluctuation of .706 per cent in the period from October 1979 through August 1981. Id. at 37.
8. N. HUDSON, MONEY AND EXCHANGE DEALING IN INTERNATIONAL BANKING 36 (1979).
The parties also may make the deal by wire, through a broker, by cable, or through some
other written instruction. Id.
9. The "value date" is the date on which the parties actually consummate the deal. Id.
at 43-44. If the transaction is a "spot" transaction the value date may be the day the deal is
made, but usually it is two days later to allow the parties time to effect payment and take
care of any formalities that various foreign exchange control laws might require. J. HEY-
WOOD, FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND THE CORPORATE TREASURER 12 (2d ed. 1979); see infra text
accompanying notes 19-28. If the transaction is a "forward" foreign exchange, the parties
will fix a date in the future when they will consummate the deal at the rate agreed upon in
the oral contract. J. HEYWOOD, supra, at 16-18; see infra text accompanying notes 29-41.
10. Payment instructions may state simply that the bank should pay the currency into
the purchaser's account. For example, if the purchaser is to receive French francs he may
instruct the selling bank to pay them into the purchaser's account in a French bank. Alter-
natively, if the purchaser of the francs is an American importer of French goods, he may
instruct the selling bank to pay the francs into the French bank account of the French
exporter from whom he has bought the goods. See C. CAMPBELL & R. CAMPBELL, AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO MONEY AND BANKING 355-56 (1972); J. HEYwOOD, supra note 9, at 11.
11. J. HEYWOOD, supra note 9, at 12; N. HUDSON, supra note 8, at 38-39.
12. The selling bank, for example, may buy the currency for its own account so that it
can deliver it to the purchaser on the value date, or it may enter into another foreign ex-
change deal to "cover" its resulting foreign exchange exposure. See J. HEYWOOD, supra note
9, at 12; infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
13. J. HEywoOD, supra note 9, at 109.
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of foreign exchange transactions. Next, the Note examines in detail
the actual mechanics of a sample foreign exchange transaction be-
tween a bank and a corporate customer, which rests upon an oral
agreement and an exchange of written confirmations. The Note
then presents arguments for and against the applicability of Arti-
cle 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) to these transac-
tions and concludes that since foreign exchange transactions
should be characterized as sales of choses in action rather than as
sales of commodities, Article 2 does not apply. Next, the Note ex-
amines the consequences of applying the section 1-206 statute of
frauds rather than the Article 2 provision. Finally, the Note fo-
cuses upon the effect of the written confirmations on a court's ef-
forts to construe the terms of the contract and concludes that
courts should apply the Article 2 parol evidence rule and section 2-
207, the "battle of the forms" provision, by analogy to these trans-
actions to achieve simplified and better-reasoned results.
The purpose of this Note is not only to benefit lawyers and
judges who must confront these problems in litigation, but also to
provide participants in the foreign exchange market with both an
understanding of the legal significance of their procedures for mak-
ing foreign exchange contracts and an appreciation of the possible
legal consequences of the mistakes that inevitably result from fol-
lowing these procedures.
I. THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET
Three separate relationships define the structure of the for-
eign exchange market. First is the relationship between commer-
cial banks that deal in foreign exchange and their customers, such
as multinational corporations, that desire to exchange currency.14
Second is the relationship between various commercial banks,
which often transact "interbank" deals through foreign exchange
brokers.15 Last is the relationship between American commercial
banks and banks in other countries.1 This Note focuses its discus-
sion upon the principal participants in the American market: non-
bank foreign exchange customers and the banks that provide for-
14. C. CAMPBELL & R. CAMPBELL, supra note 10, at 354; Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y.,
The Foreign Exchange Market in the United States, in THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET FOR
FOREIGN EXCHANGE 98, at 99 (R. Aliber ed. 1969).
15. C. CAMPBELL & R. CAMPBELL, supra note 10, at 354; Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y.,
supra note 14, at 99.
16. C. CAMPBELL & R. CAMPBELL, supra note 10, at 354; Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y.,
supra note 14, at 99.
19821 1175
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
eign exchange services to them.
A. Nonbank Participants
1. "Transaction" Foreign Exchange
Transaction 17 foreign exchange occurs when any two parties in
different countries transact a sale of goods or services. Since the
parties must invoice the sale in one country's currency, either the
importer will purchase foreign currency from a bank to pay the
exporter or the exporter will receive payment in foreign currency
that he will want to convert into his local currency. The potential
for loss or profit in these sales because of fluctuations in the ex-
change rates complicates these simple examples.18
a. Spot Exchange
The market for purchase of foreign currency for "immediate"
delivery is the "spot" market. 9 Delivery generally is not immedi-
ate but occurs two days after the day the parties make the deal.2
For example, assume that American company A contracts to
purchase 5,000 widgets from German exporter G on January 10,
payment to be made in 500,000 German marks on April 10. A be-
lieves that the mark will depreciate against the dollar, so it decides
to "lag,"'2 ' that is, wait until the last possible moment to purchase
the marks. On April 8, A telephones its bank in the United States
to purchase the necessary marks. A's bank will quote22 a spot
17. Brown & Day, Federal Regulation of Foreign Currency Trading for Future Deliv-
ery on Interbank and Futures Markets, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. R-v. 69, 72 (1981).
18. See id.; infra note 29.
19. R. CONINX, supra note 1, at 82-83; J. HEYwoOD, supra note 9, at 12; N. HUDSON,
supra note 8, at 12; Campbell & O'Connor, Taxation of Foreign Exchange Activities of
Commercial Banks, 7 TAx ADVISER 541, 543 (1976).
20. See supra note 9.
21. By "leading" and "lagging," exporters and importers attempt to take advantage of
an anticipated appreciation or depreciation of currency. If an importer who must pay a
German exporter 500,000 marks on April 10 anticipates a depreciation of the mark, then by
lagging (i.e., waiting to purchase the needed marks until April 8, or sooner if the mark shows
signs of appreciating), he will spend fewer dollars than he originally contemplated. In effect
he purchases the goods for a lower price. If, however, the mark appreciates, the importer
pays more by waiting. An importer's best course of action is to purchase the marks immedi-
ately on the forward market. See infra notes 29-41 and accompanying text.
Similarly, an exporter will wait as long as practicable before demanding payment to
attempt to profit from an anticipated appreciation of the currency in which he expects pay-
ment. If his sale is invoiced in the appreciating currency of the importer's country, he will
postpone conversion so that he will receive a maximum amount of his local currency. See R.
CONINX, supra note 1, at 73; P. EINZIG, supra note 3, at 95; N. HUDSON, supra note 8, at 16.
22. For a description of how a bank gives a quotation, see infra notes 88-89 and ac-
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rate-the current rate-for marks, and assuming A accepts the
quoted rate, a sale occurs. A probably will instruct its American
bank to pay the 500,000 marks2 s into G's account in a German
bank, and upon doing so, A's bank will debit A's dollar account or
otherwise collect from A the equivalent amount in dollars.24
If the same American company exported the widgets to the
German company for payment in marks, upon payment-or as
long as possible after payment if A were confident that the mark
would appreciate against the dollar2 5 -A would want to convert
the marks into dollars. If A had an account of marks in a German
bank, it could purchase the dollars at the spot rate from its
American bank and simply wire its German bank to transfer the
marks from A's account to the American bank's German bank ac-
count. The American bank would then credit A's account in the
amount of dollars that A's marks would buy at the spot rate.27 If A
had no German bank account, it could enter into an agreement
with its American bank to purchase the dollars before A received
payment from G and simply instruct G to pay the marks into the
German bank account of the American bank. Again, the American
bank would credit A's account for the dollar value of the marks.2
b. Forward Exchange
Importers and exporters who know that under a certain sales
contract they are to pay or receive a fixed amount-the contract
price-of foreign currency at a fixed date risk a loss if they choose
to wait and utilize the spot market to exchange currency. For ex-
ample, if an American importer who will pay marks for his German
companying text. For a more detailed description of the mechanics of a foreign exchange
transaction, see infra notes 87-105 and accompanying text.
23. The American bank already may have the marks in its own mark account in a
German bank, or it may have to purchase the marks on the foreign exchange market. See
infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
24. See C. CAMPBELL & R. CAMPBELL, supra note 10, at 356-57 for the basis of this
hypothetical import transaction.
25. See supra note 21.
26. This transaction raises a difficult question of characterization that might prevent
it from being considered along with other foreign exchange transactions as a possible sale of
"goods" under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Is the transaction a sale of
"goods" in which the American company buys a commodity (here, dollars, the local cur-
rency), using the marks as the medium of exchange, or is it a purchase of marks by the
American bank with dollars as the medium of exchange? See infra note 119 and accompany-
ing text.
27. See C. CAMPBELL & R. CAMPBELL, supra note 10, at 355-56 for a presentation of
this hypothetical export transaction.
28. Id.
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widgets three months hence waits to purchase the needed marks
hoping to take advantage of a depreciation of the mark against the
dollar, he faces the obvious risk of an appreciation instead. If the
mark appreciates, the importer must pay a greater amount in dol-
lars than he had contemplated when he negotiated the sales con-
tract.29 This unexpected fluctuation could reduce or even eliminate
the profit margin of an importer who resells the goods.3 0 A com-
pany or individual who takes this risk is said to be in a position of
transaction s" or economics' "exposure." Unless an importer or ex-
porter is confident that the exchange rate will fluctuate as he an-
ticipates, he probably will "cover '3 3 his transaction exposure in the
forward exchange market.
By purchasing the desired currency in the forward foreign ex-
change market, an importer or exporter can know with certainty
from the moment he enters into the forward exchange contract the
precise amount he will pay or receive for the goods or services sold
and the date on which this payment or receipt will take place.3 4 If
American importer A purchases widgets from German exporter G
on January 1 with payment of 500,000 marks due on April 8, A will
call his American bank on January 8 and request the ninety-day
forward exchange rate3 5 for marks. Assuming that the bank quotes
29. For example, assume importer A will pay a contract price of 500,000 German
marks for 50,000 widgets on April 10. On March 10, the contract date, the exchange rate for
the mark is 2.2575 (meaning 2.2575 marks per one dollar). Thus, to purchase the widgets, A
contemplates an expenditure of roughly $221,483.94, or less if he expects a depreciation of
the mark. If, however, the mark appreciates so that the rate becomes 2.1782, he will pay
$229,547.33, or an additional $8,063.39.
The extent of this hypothetical fluctuation of the mark rate is not unusual. In fact, it
represents a 3.514 percent change, which was the average monthly fluctuation of the mark
rate in the period from October 1979 through August 1981, according to data compiled by
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. See Revey, supra note 2, at 37. For
that same period, the Swiss franc rate changed at a monthly average of 3.791 percent, the
Japanese yen at 3.789 percent, the Canadian dollar at 1.231 percent, and the British pound
sterling at 3.388 percent. Id.
30. J. HEYWOOD, supra note 9, at 21.
31. Brown & Day, supra note 17, at 72.
32. J. HEYWOOD, supra note 9, at 53.
33. "Covering" is not the same as "hedging," which is defined infra note 49. While
covering "ensures that the value of a trade or service transaction is definitely fixed," hedging
"protect[s] the value of an asset or liability which cannot or may never be realized." R.
CONINX, supra note 1, at 76. Hedging is a long-term device designed to protect a company
from the risks of "translation" exposure by such means as restructuring the balance sheet or
taking forward cover to match the exposure. See J. HEYWOOD, supra note 9, at 149 & 152;
infra notes 42-58 and accompanying text.
34. J. HEYWOOD, supra note 9, at 21.
35. To calculate the forward exchange rate, take the spot rate at the moment the con-
tract is made and either add or subtract the "forward premium," which is based on the
1178
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a rate of 2.2385,6 A and the bank will agree that on April 8 the
bank will debit A's account37 in the amount of $223,363.851" and
pay 500,000 marks into G's German bank account.3 9 No money will
change hands until April 8. A receives as a benefit not only insur-
ance against fluctuation of the exchange rate but also the ability to
control more accurately his pricing, cash flow, budgeting, and other
financial concerns.40
If A is an American exporter who contracts on January 8 to
sell widgets to German importer G with payment of 500,000 marks
due on April 8, A can "presell" the marks on the forward market
and assure himself of the amount of dollars he will receive on April
interest differential between the two currencies. J. HEYWOOD, supra note 9, at 27-28. Nigel
A. L. Hudson explains the calculation in N. HUDSON, supra note 8, at 17-23. Hudson uses
the example of a British importer who buys goods from an American exporter with payment
in dollars due in 90 days. The importer decides to purchase the dollars forward. The spot
rate when he contracts to buy the goods is two dollars to one pound sterling. (The pound
sterling is always quoted as the number of units of foreign currency that equals one pound.
Id. at 12.) If the British bank from which the importer purchases the dollars borrows ster-
ling to buy the dollars, it must pay interest for the 90-day period. Assuming the bank rein-
vests the purchased dollars for 90 days at a lower interest rate, it only will lose the interest
differential. The bank adjusts the spot rate by subtracting a "discount" to make the dollars
more expensive for the importer to compensate the bank for the loss. Id. at 19. The bank
calculates the discount by multiplying the spot rate of exchange by the interest rate differ-
ential and by the period annualized. For example, if the differential is three percent and the
spot rate of exchange is two dollars to one pound sterling, then the forward rate for 90 days
is $1.985 to the pound ($2.00 x 3/100 x 90/360 = 0.015; $2.00 - 0.015 = $1.985). Id.
If the interest rate of the dollar had been higher than the pound rate, the interest
differential would have resulted in a "premium," which the bank would add to the exchange
rate. See id. If the interest rate of the pound is higher than the dollar rate, the pound is said
to be "at a discount" to the dollar, and the dollar "at a premium" to the pound. Id.
36. This rate is the actual 90-day forward mark rate for 3 p.m. Eastern time, Friday,
January 8, 1982, as listed in Wall St. J., Jan. 11, 1982, at 52, col. 5 (eastern ed.). Since the
spot rate for marks at that same time was 2.2575, the dollar was at a discount to the mark.
See supra note 35. The actual discount was 0.019 (2.2575 - 2.2385 = 0.019); hence, the
interest rate on the dollar was 3.37% higher than the interest rate on the mark because
2.2575 x interest differential x 90/360 = 0.019; interest differential = 0.019 divided by
(2.2575 x 90/360) = 0.0337. See supra note 35.
37. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
38. If the spot rate on the date that A entered into the sales contract was 2.2575, see
supra notes 29 & 36 and accompanying text, A might have contemplated spending only
about $221,483.94. Indeed, if the mark actually depreciated between January 8 and April 8,
the missed opportunity to pay even less might disappoint A. As one author observes, how-
ever, the premium paid for forward foreign exchange is analogous to a fire insurance pre-
mium paid by a factory owner; few factory owners seriously consider cancelling their insur-
ance to save a "wasted" premium because a year has passed without a fire. J. HEYwOOD,
supra note 9, at 19-20. The current volatility of exchange rates increases the risk of forego-
ing the "insurance" of forward foreign exchange. See supra note 29.
39. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
40. J. HEYWOOD, supra note 9, at 20.
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8. If the ninety-day forward rate is 2.2385 on January 8, A will
enter into a contract with his American bank under which on April
8 the bank will credit A's dollar account in the amount of
$223,363.85 while A either will wire his German bank to pay
500,000 marks into the German bank account of A's American
bank or instruct G to pay the 500,000 marks into the American
bank's German account.41
2. "Translation" Foreign Exchange
Multinational corporations are the principal nonbank partici-
pants in this area of foreign exchange. The foreign subsidiaries of
these corporations have assets and liabilities whose value in the
foreign currency the corporation must "translate" into a value in
local currency for purposes of consolidation on its balance sheet.42
The difference between a corporation's assets and liabilities in a
foreign currency represents the corporation's translation,' balance
sheet,44 or accounting45 exposure. For example, if an American cor-
poration owns assets in France valued at five million French francs
yet carries liabilities of only three million francs, a depreciation of
the franc against the dollar will create a loss, 46 which will appear
on the corporation's balance sheet.47 By matching its franc assets
with its franc liabilities, the corporation can protect itself from
such a fluctuation.4' The volume of foreign exchange transactions
41. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
42. J. HEYwooD, supra note 9, at 67; N. HUDSON, supra note 8, at 109-10; Brown &
Day, supra note 17, at 74.
43. J. HEYwooD, supra note 9, at 66; Brown & Day, supra note 17, at 74.
44. J. HYWOOD, supra note 9, at 66.
45. Id. at 67.
46. If the exchange rate applicable to the corporation's balance sheet for fiscal year
1981 was 5.7 francs to the dollar, the five million francs in assets would have appeared on
the corporation's balance sheet as $877,192.98, and the three million francs in liabilities
would have appeared as $526,315.78, so that the corporation's franc holdings would have
shown a $350,877.20 surplus. If the applicable rate for the 1982 balance sheet changed to
5.8, representing a depreciation in the franc, that surplus would be reduced to $344,827.59.
The corporation would show a "paper loss" of $6,049.61.
This example illustrates the accounting practices that take effect in 1982 with the Fi-
nancial Accounting Standards Board's (FASB) Statement No. 52, which requires a corpora-
tion to translate all foreign assets and liabilities at current exchange rates. Present account-
ing practices under FASB Statement No. 8 require the application of "historical" rates in
certain situations. See infra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
47. The potential severity of the impact of translation exposure was demonstrated re-
cently when IBM blamed much of its 12% drop in earnings for the fourth quarter of 1981
on "currency-translation losses." See IBM Net Fell 12% for 4th Quarter, 7.1% for Full
Year, Wall St. J., Jan. 18, 1982, at 6, col. 1 (eastern ed.).
48. N. HUDSON, supra note 8, at 110-11. If the corporation's foreign assets have the
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by corporations seeking to "hedge" against translation exposure
has grown considerably in recent years, 0 partly because of the in-
creasing volatility of exchange rates.51 Another major cause52 of the
increase in corporate hedging has been the Financial Accounting
Standards Board's (FASB) Statement No. 8. Issued in 1975, the
rule basically requires that corporations translate all balance sheet
items representing cash or amounts receivable or payable denomi-
nated in a foreign currency into dollars at the current exchange
rate as of the date of the report. The corporations, however, must
translate items representing nonmonetary assets into dollars at
historical exchange rates that prevailed on the date of the assets'
acquisition. Recently promulgated FASB Statement No. 52,1"
which requires that all balance sheet items be translated into dol-
lars at current rates,56 will supersede FASB Statement No. 8 for
fiscal years beginning on or after December 15, 1982.5 Neverthe-
less, corporations must continue to hedge in foreign exchange to
prevent "paper" losses.58
same value in francs as its French liabilities, upon depreciation of the franc against the
dollar the reduction in dollar value of these assets would counteract directly the reduction
in dollar value of the liabilities. The translation of the corporation's franc accounts would
create no paper loss or gain.
49. One author has defined "hedging" as the "[a]ct of buying or selling the currency
equivalent of a foreign asset or liability in order to protect its value against depreciation
(appreciation) or devaluation (revaluation)." R. CONINX, supra note 1, at 157. For an expla-
nation of the difference between "hedging" and "covering," see supra note 33.
50. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York estimates that the volume of foreign ex-
change purchases and sales by nonbank participants increased from $10 billion a month in
early 1977 to $42 billion a month in March 1980. Revey, supra note 2, at 38. The 75%
increase in international trade by American firms during the same period explains these
figures only in part. Id.
51. Id.
52. N. HUDSON, supra note 8, at 109.
53. FASB, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 8, Accounting for the
Translation of Foreign Currency Transactions and Foreign Currency Financial Statements
(Oct. 1975); see supra note 46.
54. Id. 7.
55. FASB, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 52, Foreign Currency
Translation (Dec. 1981).
56. Id. 1 12.
57. Id. 33.
58. See Once More. . . With Feeling, Foms, Oct. 13, 1980, at 192 ("There will still
be resultant gains and losses-any third-grader will tell you that when you multiply two
numbers by the same number the difference between them changes-but the swings won't
be as violent as under the old system.").
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a. Spot Exchange
Assume59 that American corporation A has a subsidiary, S, in
France. If S borrows one million French francs from a French
bank, then it creates a liability that A must translate into dollars
on its consolidated balance sheet. If the franc appreciates against
the dollar between the loan date and the close of A's financial re-
porting period, the dollar value of the liability would increase and
A would suffer a paper loss. To hedge against this translation ex-
posure A can borrow the amount of dollars equivalent to one mil-
lion francs, purchase one million francs with those dollars on the
spot foreign exchange market, and invest the francs.6 0 When A
makes its report it will have assets in francs that will counteract
any change in the value of its franc liability. The cost of this com-
bined spot foreign exchange market and money market method of
hedging, however, usually is greater for a corporation than is the
cost of the forward foreign exchange method."1 Consequently, A
should only use this method when its need to hedge coincides with
its need to borrow francs.62
59. See Brown & Day, supra note 17, at 74-75 for the basis of this hypothetical.
60. See H. RiEHI & R. RODRIGUEZ, FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKETS 184 (1977).
61. Id. Since in spot-exchange hedging the corporation borrows dollars to buy francs
and then invests the francs, it will pay the interest rate charged on the borrowed dollars in
dollars and collect the interest rate for the invested francs in francs. The cost of this trans-
action to the corporation is the difference in the interest rates. Id.
In a forward exchange situation, an American bank that sells francs forward to the
corporation wishing to hedge against appreciation of its franc liabilities first would borrow
the dollars with which to purchase the francs and for which it would have to pay interest.
After purchasing the francs the bank would invest them until the value date of the forward
contract and collect interest on them. See supra note 35. The cost to the bank is equal to
the difference in the interest rates. The bank transfers that cost to the purchasing corpora-
tion through the computation of the forward exchange rate. Id. The cost to the corporation
of the spot exchange hedge would be the same as the cost of the forward exchange hedge if
the interest rates charged to the corporation and the bank for the initial dollar loans were
identical. H. RimHL & R. RODRIGUEZ, supra note 60, at 184. Those interest rates, however,
will not be the same. A lending bank normally will charge a nonbank borrower a premium
over the interest rate it would charge a borrowing bank. Id. To illustrate, assume that Amer-
ican corporation A desires to hedge against translation exposure in francs. If A chooses to
use the forward exchange method, the bank from which it purchases the francs first borrows
dollars at 12% interest. The cost to the bank, and thus to A, will be the 3% interest differ-
ential, which will emerge in the exchange rate differential (assuming a 9% return on invest-
ment). If A chooses the spot exchange method, A must borrow dollars at a 13.5% interest
rate, the interbank rate plus a 1.5% permium. A can invest the francs it purchases but will
collect only the same 9% interest. The cost to A will be 4.5%.
62. H. RiaHL & R. RODRIGUEZ, supra note 60, at 185-86.
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b. Forward Exchange
A can hedge against this same translation exposure situation
in the forward exchange market. After A's French subsidiary S
borrows one million francs, A can purchase one million francs for-
ward with a value date near the date on which A must make its
financial report. The increase in the value of the purchased francs
would offset any appreciation in the franc against the dollar and
the resulting increase in the value of that franc liability.63 A could
use this same procedure to hedge against translation exposure of
assets as well. If S had one million francs in assets not matched by
franc liabilities, A could protect itself from a paper loss that would
result from a depreciation of the franc by selling one million francs
forward, with a value date near the date on which it must make its
financial reports. If the franc depreciated, A's gain from selling
francs at a rate higher than the spot rate would offset A's loss in
value of its franc assets."
B. Bank Participants
Banks that participate in the foreign exchange market have
three main objectives." First, they want to satisfy the needs of
their customers." Second, they must manage their own foreign
currency exposure.67 Last, they seek to create a profit for them-
selves.68 The first objective has contributed to a growth in bank
foreign exchange activity because the customers themselves have
increased their demands.69 But the primary area of banks' in-
creased foreign exchange activity is in the "interbank" market,70 in
which banks trade among themselves. The second objec-
tive-management of the banks' exposure-has caused a consider-
able increase in interbank trading71 as exchange rates have become
more volatile.72 As banks' foreign exchange departments have
grown larger and more sophisticated in the pursuit of these first
63. Brown & Day, supra note 17, at 75.
64. Id.
65. N. HUDSON, supra note 8, at 31; H. RMH & R. RODRIGUEZ, supra note 60, at 13-14.
66. N. HUDSON, supra note 8, at 31; H. RIHL & R. RODRIGUEZ, supra note 60, at 14.
67. N. HUDSON, supra note 8, at 31; H. RIEHL & R. RODRIGUEZ, supra note 60, at 14.
68. N. HUDSON, supra note 8, at 31; H. RMEHL & R. RODRIGUEZ, supra note 60, at 14.
69. See supra note 50.
70. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York estimates that "fully one half of the $385
billion increase in foreign exchange turnover between 1977 and 1980 is accounted for by
'pure' interbank positioning." Revey, supra note 2, at 33.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 36-37; see supra note 29.
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two objectives, they have attained their third objective by becom-
ing more adept at seizing the opportunity to profit from fluctuating
exchange rates.~
1. Transactions with Customers
When a customer purchases foreign currency from an Ameri-
can bank, the bank will pay the customer with currency from its
own account in a bank that is in the country of the currency.7 4
These accounts are called "nostro" accounts.7 5 If the American
bank can pay the customer with the currency in its nostro account,
the bank is "long" in that currency.78 If the bank must purchase
the currency itself to meet the customer's needs,7 from the mo-
ment it contracts to sell the currency to the customer until it
purchases the currency itself, the bank is "short" in that cur-
rency." A bank that has long or short exposure in a currency will
experience gains or losses from exchange rate fluctuations. A
bank's management of that exposure gives rise to more foreign ex-
change transactions, especially on the interbank market.7 9 Banks
profit from transactions with customers by charging a customer an
exchange rate higher than the rate at which the bank acquires the
currency,80 although still keeping its rates competitive.81
2. Exposure Management
Increased exchange rate volatility has caused banks to resort
to more spot trading to protect themselves from even overnight ex-
posure."' Banks that find themselves short or long will rush to
make a spot transaction to balance their position.8 For example, a
bank that sells five million French francs on the spot market to a
customer or another bank immediately will purchase the francs on
73. Revey, supra note 2, at 33.
74. P. EINZIG, supra note 3, at 26; N. HUDSON, supra note 8, at 32. The foreign bank is
called the American bank's "correspondent." H. RimHL & R. RODRIGuEZ, supra note 60, at
15. A bank that carries on a great amount of international business might have its own
foreign branch as its correspondent. Id.
75. P. EINzIG, supra note 3, at 26; N. HUDSON, supra note 8, at 32.
76. R. CoNINX, supra note 1, at 39.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
80. N. HUDSON, supra note 8, at 33.
81. Id.
82. Revey, supra note 2, at 37-38. Since 1978, exposure in a currency at the end of a
trading day has become more unusual for banks. Id. at 38.
83. Id. at 34.
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the spot market from another bank or customer to prevent a loss
in case the franc appreciates. Banks now are less willing to delay a
purchase hoping for a depreciation of the franc.
Similarly, a bank that sells five million French francs forward
for settlement in three months risks a loss by waiting to purchase
the francs on the spot market at the date of settlement. The bank
can cover its exposure by buying five million francs forward for
settlement in three months.84 The gain in the purchase of the
francs would offset any loss to the bank that might result from
selling the francs if they should appreciate.85 Through careful man-
agement of these transactions, banks can take advantage of differ-
ing exchange rates, differing interest rates, and the strength of cer-
tain currencies to profit from these foreign exchange transactions."
III. MECHANICS OF A SAMPLE FOREIGN EXCHANGE TRANSACTION
A, an American corporation, has subsidiaries in several coun-
tries. Its West German subsidiary, G, plans to borrow 22,575,000
German marks from a German bank on September 8, 1984.8  A
determines that to insure against an appreciation of the mark
against the dollar and the balance sheet loss that this appreciation
would create, on September 6, 1984 it should purchase 22,575,000
marks ninety days forward with settlement due on December 8,
1984, the final day of A's fiscal year.
On September 6, A's treasurer, Mr. Hamilton, telephones the
foreign exchange department of the Fifth National Bank of New
York, where a dealer, Ms. Cash, answers. Hamilton tells Cash that
A needs 22,575,000 marks ninety days forward in exchange for dol-
lars and asks for a quotation. Cash gives a quotation of "2.23 70/
85,''a which Hamilton knows to mean that the bank will sell marks
84. N. HUDSON, supra note 8, at 52. The bank might also borrow the necessary dollars,
purchase the francs on the spot market, and invest the francs for three months, or use the
"swap" market by simultaneously purchasing francs on the spot market and selling the
francs three months forward. Id. at 53-54. The "swap" is valuable because a gain in the spot
purchase of the francs would offset any loss from the sale of the francs that would result
from appreciation of the franc. H. RIEHL & R. RODRIGUEZ, supra note 60, at 83.
85. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
86. For a discussion of methods a bank foreign exchange dealer can use to obtain prof-
its from these transactions, see N. HUDSON, supra note 8, at 46-60.
87. This sample transaction takes place in the future so that FASB Statement No. 52
will apply and require A to translate both the loan liability and the forward purchased asset
on its balance sheet into dollars at the rate prevailing at the time of the financial report. See
supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
88. J. HEYWOOD, supra note 9, at 27. The quoting dealer may use a shorthand version,
for example, "70/85 on 3," which represents the last three digits of the buy and sell quota-
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ninety days forward at a rate of 2.2370 to the dollar.8 ' Hamilton
states that A will buy 22,575,000 marks for value December 8.90
Cash replies, "All right, we sell you German marks 22,575,000 and
buy the dollars for value 8 December at a rate of 2.2370. Where do
you want your German marks?"' 1 Hamilton responds, "Please pay
the German marks to Kreditbank, Frankfurt, for an account of G.
We pay the dollars from our account at Fifth National Bank of
New York. We will confirm the deal and payment instructions.' 2
When the conversation ends Cash immediately fills out a "deal
ticket."' 3 Cash records the name and location of A, the date of the
deal, the value date of the transaction, the currency and amount
sold, the currency and amount purchased, the agreed upon rate of
exchange, the designation of forward rather than spot delivery,
payment instructions, and Cash's own initials for the purpose of
accountability. 4 Cash gives the ticket to the bank's "position
keeper,' 5 who updates the bank's position in the appropriate cur-
rencies by recording the currency, the amount sold and purchased,
the customer's name, the rate, and the value date.'8 The position
keeper sends the ticket to the bank's "operations" or "servicing"
department, 7 which prepares a confirmation of the deal.' 8 The
confirmation reads, "We hereby confirm the deal done with you by
telephone earlier today in which we sold you German marks
22,575,000 against U.S. dollars for value December 8, 1984 at a rate
tions (2.2370 and 2.2385), assuming that the other party already knows the first two digits.
Id. at 14. The dealer also may quote forward rates simply in terms of the forward premium;
that is, the difference between the spot rate and forward rate. For example, if the full spot
quotation were "2.25 55/65" and the full forward quotation were "2.23 70/85," the premium
quotation would be "185/180" [(2.2555 - 2.2370 = 0.0185) and (2.2565 - 2.2385 = 0.0180)].
When the first figure in this "premium quotation" is greater than the second, the currency
(here, the mark) is at a premium to the dollar; if the second is larger, the currency is at a
discount to the dollar. Id. at 27; see supra note 35.
89. The quotation means that the bank will purchase marks against the dollar at a
rate of 2.2385 and will sell at a rate of 2.2370. J. HEYWOOD, supra note 9, at 14; N. HUDSON,
supra note 8, at 40; H. RIEHL & R. RODRIGUEZ, supra note 60, at 66.
90. Hamilton determines the value date for the forward transaction by adding the for-
ward time (90 days) to the spot date appropriate for the dealing date (2 days after). See J.
HEYWOOD, supra note 9, at 25. Since the dealing date is September 6, the spot date is Sep-
tember 8 and the value date is December 7.
91. Cash's reply is based upon an example in id. at 11.
92. Hamilton's response is based upon an example in id. at 11.
93. N. HUDSON, supra note 8, at 36.
94. Id. at 36-37.
95. Id. at 37.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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of 2.2370. From Fifth National Bank of New York."'9 The opera-
tions department wires this confirmation to A, and mails a similar
confirmation signed by an authorized officer that includes payment
instructions and other information. 100 The operations department
awaits A's incoming confirmation and upon receipt compares the
terms with its own record of the deal to ensure that both parties
are in agreement.101
A's treasury staff similarly records the deal after the telephone
conversation and wires a written confirmation that reads, "We con-
firm the deal done with you by telephone today in which we
bought German marks 22,575,000 against U.S. dollars for value De-
cember 8, 1984, at a rate of 2.2370. From A. "21 A also mails a con-
firmation, signed by its treasurer, Hamilton, that includes payment
instructions and other information.103 The treasury staff checks the
bank's confirmation upon receipt to ensure that the terms are the
same.
1 0 4
During these procedures, two events occur that highlight the
risk of the transaction. First, Fifth National has matched the deal
with a reverse transaction 05 by purchasing 22,575,000 German
marks against dollars for value December 8 at a rate close to
2.2370. Second, the exchange rate has changed dramatically even
since Fifth National's matching transaction. Consequently, a dis-
covery by the parties of conflicting terms in the confirmations
threatens the bank with an exposure loss attributable to its match-
ing transaction, and A with an exposure loss from its now "un-
hedged" mark loan liability. What, then, are the legal positions of
these parties if the terms set forth in the exchanged confirmations
are not identical? This Note next discusses basic legal principles
relevant to the determination of the rights of the parties to this
transaction.
99. This confirmation is based upon an example in J. HzYwOOD, supra note 9, at 88.
100. Id. at 88-89. The mail confirmation also might include the name and telephone
number of the individual handling any inquiries about the transaction and the name of the
person who made the deal by telephone. Id. at 89.
101. N. HuDSON, supra note 8, at 37.
102. See supra note 99.
103. See supra note 101.
104. J. HEYwOOD, supra note 9, at 89.
105. Id.
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IV. CONTRACT LAW AND THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE TRANSACTION
A. Is Article 2 of the U.C.C. Applicable?
A difficult threshold question is whether contract principles
embodied in the U.C.C. or the common law are applicable to for-
eign exchange transactions. Only one reported case since the pro-
mulgation of the U.C.C. has considered a foreign exchange transac-
tion in the context of contract law litigation.106 In that case,
United Equities Co. v. First National City Bank,10 7 both the New
York Supreme Court"°8 and the Supreme Court Appellate Divi-
sion1 09 applied various sections of Article 2110 of the U.C.C. to a
dispute over delivery of Japanese yen under a forward foreign ex-
change contract after the Japanese government, during the interim
period between the contract date and the value date, imposed new
regulations prohibiting delivery to certain nonresident Japanese
accounts."' The parties apparently did not dispute the applicabil-
ity of Article 2 and neither court questioned it. Thus, although the
case serves as an example of how courts can apply Article 2 effec-
tively to foreign exchange transactions, it offers no direct authority
for the statute's applicability. Although a strong case could have
been made for applying Article 2 in United Equities, a careful ex-
amination of both the scope of the statute and the nature of for-
eign exchange transactions leads to the conclusion that courts
should apply the U.C.C. only by analogy, if at all.
Article 2 applies to "transactions in goods.""' 2 The statute de-
fines "goods" as "all things. . . which are moveable at the time of
106. The U.C.C. was promulgated in 1951 and first enacted by the state of Pennsylva-
nia in 1953. General Comment, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE OFFICIAL TExT-1978, at xv
(9th ed. 1978).
107. 52 A.D.2d 154, 383 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1976), rev'g 84 Misc. 2d 441, 374 N.Y.S.2d 937
(Sup. Ct. 1975), afl'd, 41 N.Y.2d 1032, 363 N.E.2d 1385, 395 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1977).
108. 84 Misc. 2d 441, 374 N.Y.S.2d 937 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
109. 52 A.D.2d 154, 383 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1976).
110. The Supreme Court cited §§ 2-503, -614, -713, and -715, 84 Misc. 2d at 442-45,
374 N.Y.S.2d at 939-42, while the Appellate Division cited §§ 2-503, -614, and -713, 52
A.D.2d at 158, 161-63, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 9, 11-13.
111. 52 A.D.2d at 155, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 7-8. The parties entered into a contract on
April 12, 1971, for the purchase of 360,000,000 Japanese yen six months forward against
$1,018,710 with delivery of the yen to take place in Japan on October 14, 1971. The pur-
chaser of the yen, United Equities Co., had no yen bank account in Japan, and in the in-
terim the Japanese government declared that nonresidents who had no yen account prior to
September 6, 1971, could not open one subsequent to that date. Id. United Equities had no
time to open a new account and thus had no way to receive delivery in Japan as the contract
required. Id. at 156, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 8.
112. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1978).
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identification to the contract for sale other than the money in
which the price is to be paid, investment securities (Article 8) and
things in action."11 The Official Comment to this definition elab
orates:
The exclusion of "money in which the price is to be paid" from the def-.
nition of goods does not mean that foreign currency which is included in the
definition of money may not be the subject matter of a sales transaction.
Goods is intended to cover the sale of money when money is being treated as
a comodity but not to include it when money is the medium of payment.
1
'4
The "Practice Commentary" of the New York codification of this
definition adds that "'money', other than the money in which the
price is to be paid, is included in the definition of 'goods': thus a
contract for sale of coins or of foreign currency is a contract for
sale of goods." 115
While no cases actually have held that foreign currency is a
good for Article 2 purposes, a federal district court has held in In
re Midas Coin Co.11 6 that United States coins sold for profit are
"goods" as defined in Article 9 of the U.C.C.11 7 That definition of
"goods" "includes all things which are moveable at the time the
security interest attaches . but does not include money."118 Al-
though coins sold for their numismatic value are distinguishable
from foreign currency, this case underscores the difference between
money used as a medium of payment and money sold as a com-
modity. The court considered the Article 9 definition of goods in
light of the Article 2 definition and concluded:
The definition of "money" as used in the Code, to mean "a medium of ex-
change" etc. clearly has no reference to money when treated as a commodity.
It is our view, therefore, that the exclusion of "money" in the definition of
"goods" pertains solely to money when used as a medium of exchange and
intended to be so used by the parties at the time of the transaction in ques-
tion. When used or intended to be used and treated as a commodity, as were
the coins here involved, they are to be considered "goods," just as are all
other commodities.
11
'
113. Id. § 2-105(1).
114. Id. § 2-105 official comment 1.
115. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-105 practice commentary n.2 (McKinney 1964).
116. 264 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Mo. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Zuke v. St. Johns Community
Bank, 387 F.2d 118 (8th Cir. 1968).
117. 264 F. Supp. at 197-98. See also Morauer v. Deak & Co., 26 U.C.C. REP. SERV.
(CALLAGHAN) 1142 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1979) (applying Article 2 to sale of gold and silver for-
eign coins).
118. U.C.C. § 9-105(h) (1978).
119. 264 F. Supp. at 197. Most authority that supports the application of Article 2 to
foreign exchange transactions mentions only foreign currency, not dollars, as a good. See,
e.g., supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text. Midas Coin, however, demonstrates that
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Early case law provides two arguably valid approaches for
treating a foreign exchange transaction as the sale of a commod-
ity.120 One approach focuses on the purchaser's intended use of the
currency: If the purchaser plans to resell the currency rather than
use it as a medium of exchange, the courts would classify the
money as a commodity. In Richard v. American Union Bank121 a
bank entered into a contract to sell 2,000,000 Romanian lei by
cable transfer to the purchaser's account in a Bucharest bank. The
issue before the New York Court of Appeals was whether the
transaction represented the sale of a medium of exchange or a
commodity for purposes of determining whether a delay in delivery
had damaged the plaintiff purchaser."' Noting that at the time of
the transaction both parties understood that the purchaser had
planned to resell the lei in the United States rather than use it as
as a medium of exchange in Romania, the court held that the con-
tract was for the sale of a commodity. 123 In a Missouri case,
Liepman v. Rothschild,124 two individuals entered into a contract
which provided that one party would purchase a sum of German
marks and deliver half to the other. The court did not specify
whether the parties contemplated physical delivery of mark notes,
a cable transfer, or even delivery of a bank draft. In determining
whether the contract fell within the statute of frauds, the court
had to decide whether the transaction was for the sale of marks as
United States "money" can have a value other than as a medium of payment, and U.C.C. §
2-105 official comment 1 is subject to an interpretation that allows treatment of United
States dollars as a good: "Goods is intended to cover the sale of money when money is being
treated as a commodity. .. ." Id. This discussion, however, might be purely academic since
one can view any foreign exchange transaction from the other party's perspective and de-
scribe a corporation's purchase of dollars from a bank in exchange for French francs as a
purchase of francs by the bank.
120. Zimmerman v. Roessler & Hasslacher Chemical Co., 211 A.D. 321, 207 N.Y.S. 370
(1925), offers support for the characterization of a foreign exchange transaction as a sale of
goods, although to decide whether the New York Appellate Division's rationale for that clas-
sification is curious. The court had to characterize a contract for cable transfer of German
marks as a sale of goods or a sale of "credit" to determine whether the state's Sales of Goods
Act should apply. The court decided that the contract could not be for the sale of a credit
because the parties had not specified a time and place for the establishment of the credit.
Id. at 323, 207 N.Y.S. at 371-72. Without further explanation the court concluded that the
contract was for the sale of marks as goods.
121. 253 N.Y. 166, 170 N.E. 532 (1930).
122. If the purchaser intended to use the lei as a medium of exchange in Romania any
change in the exchange rate that occurred while he awaited delivery would not affect the
buying power of the lei. On the other hand, if the purchaser planned to resell the lei as a
commodity the fluctuation in the exchange rate could affect the value of the commodity.
123. 253 N.Y. at 175, 170 N.E. at 535.
124. 216 Mo. App. 251, 262 S.W. 685 (1924).
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a commodity or as "money." The court found that since the
United States was at war with Germany at the time of the transac-
tion, the parties could not have intended to use the marks as
money. Hence, the transaction was a sale of marks as a commodity
and within the statute of frauds.12 5 In Reisfeld v. Jacobs 12 a New
York court held that a contract to sell Russian ruble notes in spe-
cific denominations fell within the New York Personal Property
Law statute of frauds, which expressly excluded "money" from its
coverage. The notes, which a government no longer in power had
issued,1 27 clearly were not usable as "money." The statute, how-
ever, did cover the sale of goods or choses in action, and the court's
decision seemed to rest on its ambiguous characterization of the
rubles, which the plaintiff purchased for resale, as either goods or
choses in action.12 8
If a court today were to follow the reasoning of Richard,
Liepman, and Reisfeld, Article 2 would govern the transaction of a
purchaser who intended to resell the money on the foreign ex-
change market but not the transaction of an importer who pur-
chased the foreign money to pay his exporter. The definition of
goods contained in Article 2, however, does not consider the pur-
chaser's intended subsequent use of the subject of a sale. By ex-
cluding "money in which the price is to be paid, 1 29 the definition
focuses on the role of the money in the immediate transaction that
is before the court. In an ordinary contract for the sale of a good,
the "good" is the subject of the contract of sale while the money
paid in exchange is the "medium of payment." In a foreign ex-
change transaction the customer's desired foreign money is the
subject of the sale while the money he pays in exchange is the me-
dium of payment.13 0 Even if the customer later uses the purchased
foreign money as the medium of payment in another transaction,
that transaction is entirely separate from the initial purchase.
125. Id. at 255-56, 262 S.W. at 686.
126. 107 Misc. 1, 176 N.Y.S. 223 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
127. Id. at 3, 176 N.Y.S. at 224.
128. The court stated that the characterization of the rubles as choses in action offers
"an additional reason for holding the Statute of Frauds applicable." Id.
129. U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (1978).
130. "Goods is intended to cover the sale of money when money is being treated as a
commodity but not to include it when money is the medium of payment." U.C.C. § 2-105
official comment 1 (1978). If foreign currency in a foreign exchange transaction is called the
medium of payment, then any commodity that is the subject of a purchase and sale also
must be referred to as a medium of payment. Clearly, Article 2 does not contemplate this
characterization but rather views a good as the subject of a sale in which the money paid for
it is "the medium of payment." A sale can only have one medium of payment.
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Clearly, then, the Article 2 exclusion of "money" from its defini-
tion of goods would not apply to the foreign money that a cus-
tomer buys in a foreign exchange transaction.
Melzer v. Zimmerman31 suggests the second and correct ap-
proach that courts should follow in determining the applicability
of Article 2 to foreign exchange transactions. In Melzer the parties
expressly contracted for an "over the counter"13 2 sale of Austrian
kronen rather than for a cable transfer of the money. The court
distinguished carefully the transaction from a transfer of a "de-
posit account" and held that because the contract was for the ac-
tual delivery of currency it fell within New York's Personal Prop-
erty Law as a sale of a commodity or goods. 133 In contrast, the
foreign exchange transactions that this Note addresses concern the
transfer of funds from one bank account to another rather than
actual physical delivery of currency or notes. 13 The Article 2 defi-
nition of goods itself suggests that it applies only to transactions
for the physical delivery of notes. Section 2-105(1) excludes from
the definition of goods "things in action." The drafters of Article 2
surely must have intended "things in action," which the U.C.C.
does not define, to have the same meaning as the more common
"choses in action," ' 5 of which bank accounts are one obvious ex-
ample.138 When a bank sells a purchaser foreign money, the pur-
chaser generally receives not physical money but a credit to his
foreign bank account, 87 which represents a chose in action against
his foreign bank for that amount.3 8
131. 118 Misc. 407, 194 N.Y.S. 222 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
132. Id. at 408, 194 N.Y.S. at 223.
133. Id., 194 N.Y.S. at 223-24.
134. "A foreign exchange deal is a contract to exchange a bank balance in one cur-
rency for a bank balance in another currency at an agreed price for settlement on an agreed
date." J. H.ywoOD, supra note 9, at 11.
135. A "chose in action" is defined as a "right of bringing an action or right to recover
a debt or money." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 219 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). Indeed, "chose" is the
French word for "thing." Perhaps the drafters wished to modernize this traditional law
phrase. For a discussion of the meaning of "things in action" in § 2-105(1), see Squillante,
Commercial Code Review, 76 CoM. L.J. 42 (1971).
136. See, e.g., State v. Tauscher, 227 Or. 1, 360 P.2d 764 (1961).
137. See, e.g., Samuels v. E.F. Drew & Co., 296 F. 882, 886 (2d Cir. 1924) ("Even when
the obligation is performed and the credit established, the customer is only the owner of an
obligation or chose in action and not of any actual foreign money.").
138. Several early cases characterized foreign exchange transactions as sales of choses
in action. See, e.g., Samuels v. E.F. Drew & Co., 296 F. 882 (2d Cir. 1924) (funds paid to
bank for purchase of foreign credit held not a special deposit); Gravenhorst v. Zimmerman,
236 N.Y. 22, 139 N.E. 766 (1923) (contract for future creation of a foreign credit held an
executory contract subject to rescission); Equitable Trust Co. v. Keene, 232 N.Y. 290, 133
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The annoying and seemingly overly technical problem of
whether to characterize a foreign transaction as a chose in action
or as a good exists because the concept of a foreign exchange trans-
action differs from its effectuation. The purchaser wants a com-
modity such as French francs, but because the commodity is
money the transaction is made through banking channels, in which
application of the Article 2 concept of goods is inappropriate.139
Clearly, the foreign money in these transactions cannot be goods
because the money is not "movable at the time of identification to
the contract. ' 14 0 Hence, the drafters of Article 2 must have in-
tended that the statute cover only sales of foreign money in the
form of hard currency.14 1
Yet courts should not hesitate to apply Article 2 to foreign
exchange transactions "by analogy" whenever appropriate.42 The
drafters intended the U.C.C. "to simplify, clarify and modernize
the law governing commercial transactions"114 and "to make uni-
form the law among the various jurisdictions.' ' 44 This Note next
discusses various contract law problems that arise in foreign ex-
change transactions, and suggests that although common-law con-
tract principles may be applicable, courts, lawyers, and the parties
to these transactions all would benefit from the simplification and
increased uniformity that an application of Article 2 by analogy
would provide.
N.E. 894 (1922) (contract for future creation of a foreign credit held an executory contract
and therefore not within applicable statute of frauds); Legniti v. Mechanics & Metals Nat'l
Bank, 230 N.Y. 415, 130 N.E. 597 (1921) (foreign exchange transaction held a sale of a
"credit" and no trust relationship existed between bank and foreign exchange customer).
139. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
140. U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (1978).
141. Professor Williston lends support to this conclusion in his critique of the Equita-
ble Trust case in which he stated, "As it is evident that the English money was not to be
transferred in specie, the contract was not for the sale of a commodity. S. WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 520B n.9 (3d ed. 1969).
142. For a case in which a court applied the U.C.C. by analogy to the sale of a chose in
action, see Zamore v. Whitten, 395 A.2d 435 (Me. 1978). For discussion of other areas in
which courts have applied the U.C.C. analogously, see Mallor, Utility "Services" Under the
Uniform Commercial Code: Are Public Utilities in For a Shock?, 56 NOTRa DAME LAw. 89
(1980); Murray, Under the Spreading Analogy of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 39 FORDHAM L. REv. 447 (1971).
143. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a) (1978).
144. Id. § 1-102(2)(c).
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B. The Statute of Frauds
1. Article 2
Since parties to foreign exchange transactions often conduct
their deals over the telephone, a discussion of contract law as ap-
plied to these transactions must begin with the statute of frauds.
Here the question of the applicability of Article 2 of the U.C.C.
becomes crucial, for if these transactions were sales of "goods,"
section 2-201 would render unenforceable any foreign exchange
contract with a price of $500 or more unless the transaction com-
plied with one of two requisite formalities. Either the party enforc-
ing the contract must produce an adequate written confirmation
signed by the other party or, if both parties are "merchants," the
enforcing party must have sent a confirmation to the other party
and, within ten days of receipt by the other party, must not have
received written notice of objection.1 45 Since, however, an adequate
confirmation need only "afford a basis for believing that the of-
fered oral evidence rests on a real transaction ' 146 and include the
"quantity term, ' 147 the confirmation normally sent by both par-
ties14 8 in a foreign exchange transaction should meet easily the
statute's writing requirement.1 4 9 Furthermore, the signature re-
quirement poses no serious problem since even a printed or typed
signature will suffice. 50
145. Section 2-201 states in pertinent part:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of goods for
the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is
some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the
parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his author-
ized agent or broker. A writing is not insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a
term agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the
quantity of goods shown in such writing.
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the
contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party receiving it has
reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of subsection (1) against such
party unless written notice of objection to its contents is given within 10 days after it is
received.
Id. § 2-201.
146. Id. § 2-201 official comment 1.
147. Id.
148. See supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
149. For an example of a case in which a written confirmation removed an oral tele-
phone contract from the § 2-201 statute of frauds, see Lambert Corp. v. Evans, 575 F.2d 132
(7th Cir. 1978).
150. U.C.C. § 1-201(39) (1978) defines "signed" as "any symbol executed or adopted
by a party with present intention to authenticate a writing." Official comment 39 to § 1-201
elaborates: "Authentication may be printed, stamped or written; it may be by initials or by
1194
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Because foreign exchange transactions almost always will be
"between merchants" for purposes of the statute of frauds," 1 a
party may protect himself by always sending a signed confirmation
to the other party after the two have reached an agreement 6 " and
by promptly sending written notice of objection if he receives a
"confirmation" of a deal that he did not make. For further protec-
tion, an inexperienced party who might not qualify as a
"merchant" should demand a written confirmation from the other
party. The latter's refusal would entitle the demanding party to
suspend performance of his obligation."5" The other party's failure
thumbprint." Id. § 1-201 official comment 39.
A court held a typed signature sufficient in A & G Constr. Co. v. Reid Bros. Logging
Co., 547 P.2d 1207 (Alaska 1976).
151. Section 2-104(3) states that "'[b]etween merchants' means in any transaction
with respect to which both parties are chargeable with the knowledge or skill of merchants."
U.C.C. § 2-104(3) (1978). Section 2-104 defines "merchant" as
a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself
out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the
transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment
of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as
having such knowledge or skill.
Id. § 2-104. A transaction between banks almost always will be "between merchants." Even
a bank or corporation that is inexperienced in foreign exchange may be a merchant for
purposes of the statute of frauds provision according to official comment 2 to § 2-104.
The term "merchant" as defined here roots in the "law merchant" concept of a
professional in business. The professional status under the definition may be based
upon specialized knowledge as to the goods, specialized knowledge as to business prac-
tices, or specialized knowledge as to both and which kind of specialized knowledge may
be sufficient to establish the merchant status is indicated by the nature of the
provisions.
The special provisions as to merchants appear only in this Article and they are of
three kinds. Sections 2-201(2), 2-205, 2-207 and 2-209 dealing with the statute of
frauds, firm offers, confirmatory memoranda and modification rest on normal business
practices which are or ought to be typical of and familiar to any person in business. For
purposes of these sections almost every person in business would, therefore, be
deemed to be a "merchant" under the language "who . . . by his occupation holds
himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices ... involved in the
transaction . ." [sic] since the practices involved in the transaction are non-specialized
business practices such as answering mail. In this type of provision, banks or even uni-
versities, for example, well may be "merchants."
Id. § 2-104 official comment 2 (Emphasis added). Since § 2-201(2) requires only that the
parties have experience in answering mail, any foreign exchange transaction will fall within
this subsection.
152. Under § 2-201(2) the party must send the confirmation "within a reasonable
time. What is a reasonable time for taking any action depends on the nature, purpose and
circumstances of such action." Id. § 1-204(2). A reasonable time in the foreign exchange
market may be shorter than in other industries because of fluctuating exchange rates. See
Lish v. Compton, 547 P.2d 223 (Utah 1976) (twelve days not a reasonable time in fluctuat-
ing wheat market).
153. "When reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with respect to the performance of
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to sign a written confirmation after promising to do so, may estop
him from pleading the statute of frauds as a defense. 4
Article 2 also provides for satisfaction of the statute of frauds
through partial performance. A contract that fails to meet the writ-
ing requirement nevertheless is enforceable "with respect to goods
for which payment has been made and accepted or which have
been received and accepted." 15 The difficulty of applying Article 2
to transactions in "nonmovable" items, such as foreign exchange
transactions is particularly apparent in this instance because the
parties effect delivery and payment by cable transfer and bank ac-
count adjustments.156 Section 2-606, however, which describes ac-
ceptance of goods, offers some guidance by declaring that a buyer
accepts goods when he "does any act inconsistent with the seller's
ownership. 15 7 A purchaser who sells, invests, or spends money de-
livered to his account by the seller accepts that money and
removes the contract from the statute of frauds. An examination of
the purchaser's financial records should reveal any such act. A
seller, however, who has delivered foreign money into the account
of a foreign exporter according to the instructions given by a pur-
chaser who seeks merely to pay the exporter for purchased goods
cannot demonstrate acceptance in this way. Can a bank's delivery
of German marks into the account of a German exporter according
to the importer's instructions constitute delivery to the purchaser?
Does the exporter's acceptance of delivery, however manifested, re-
present an acceptance by the purchaser? These actions hardly con-
stitute an "unambiguous overt admission by both parties that a
contract actually exists."1 58 Consequently, a bank that sells foreign
money to an importer or exporter who needs the money to effect
payment would have to rely on written confirmations to remove
the foreign exchange contract from the statute of frauds.
If, however, a court determines, as indeed it should, that sec-
either party the other may in writing demand adequate assurance of due performance and
until he receives such assurance may if commercially reasonable suspend any performance
for which he has not already received the agreed return." U.C.C. § 2-609(1) (1978). "After
receipt of a justified demand failure to provide within a resonable time not exceeding
thirty days such assurance of due performance as is adequate under the circumstances of
the particular case is a repudiation of the contract." Id. § 2-609(4). See RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 141 comment b (1981).
154. See Rockland Indus. v. Frank Kasmir Assoc., 470 F. Supp. 1176 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
155. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(c) (1978).
156. See C. CAMPBELL & R. CAMPBELL, supra note 10, at 355-56; N. HUDSON, supra
note 8, at 39; supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text.
157. U.C.C. § 2-606(1)(c) (1978).
158. Id. § 2-201 official comment 2.
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tion 2-201 is not applicable to foreign exchange transactions be-
cause they are sales of choses in action, then it should not apply
that provision even by analogy. Rather, the court should apply the
section 1-206 statute of frauds, which covers sales of choses in
action. 15 '
2. Section 1-206
Section 1-206 of the U.C.C. requires a writing for a contract
for the sale of "personal property" to be enforceable beyond
$5,000.60 Unlike the various state statutes of frauds, which gener-
ally do not cover contracts for sales of choses in action,161 the Offi-
cial Comment to section 1-206 reveals that the drafters clearly in-
tended this statute to cover sales of bank accounts. 6 2
Section 1-206 does not offer the same guidance as the Official
Comment to section 2-201 on the sufficiency of written memo-
randa, although section 1-206 does require that the writing indi-
cate a "defined or stated price" and that it "reasonably identif[y]
the subject matter. '1 63 Thus, signed confirmations should satisfy
the section 1-206 statute of frauds if, as section 2-201 requires,
they "afford a basis for believing that the offered oral evidence
rests on a real transaction," include a quantity term,' and, in ad-
dition, reasonably identify the foreign money that is the subject
matter of the sale and state the price. The confirmations tradition-
ally sent by both parties to foreign exchange transactions easily
159. See infra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
160. U.S.C. § 1-206 (1978) provides:
(1) Except in the cases described in subsection (2) of this section a contract for the
sale of personal property is not enforceable by way of action or defense beyond five
thousand dollars in amount or value of remedy unless there is some writing which indi-
cates that a contract for sale has been made between the parties at a defined or stated
price, reasonably identifies the subject matter, and is signed by the party against whom
enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent.
(2) Subsection (1) of this section does not apply to contract for the sale of goods
(Section 2-201) nor of securities (Section 8-319) nor to security agreements (Section 9-
203).
161. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRArs § 110 (1981).
162. The Official Comment to § 1-206 states that the section's purpose is to "fill the
gap left by the Statute of Frauds provisions for goods (Section 2-201), securities (Section 8-
319), and security interests (Section 9-203). . . . [T]he principal gap relates to sale of the
"general intangibles" defined in Article 9 (Section 9-106) and to transactions excluded from
Article 9 by Section 9-104." Section 9-104(1) provides that Article 9 does not apply to "a
transfer of an interest in any deposit account." A "deposit account" includes "a demand,
time, savings, passbook or like account maintained with a bank." Id. § 9-105(e).
163. Id. § 1-206(1).
164. See supra notes 145-50 and accompanying text.
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should satisfy these requirements. 6 5
Because section 1-206 omits the 2-201(2) provision for
merchants a party who seeks to enforce the contract must rely on
the other party to draw up and sign a confirmation. The enforcing
party should demand that the other party send a signed confirma-
tion. A refusal by the other party would entitle the demanding
party to suspend his own performance and obtain restitution for
any performance he already may have rendered.'66 Failure by the
other party to sign a confirmation after he has promised to do so
may estop him from pleading the statute of frauds as a defense. 67
Unlike section 2-201, section 1-206 does not allow satisfaction
of its requirements by partial performance or even by the other
party's admission that a contract exists. 68 If a party fails to meet
the strict writing requirements of section 1-206, however, the con-
sequences are lenient. For example, a contract within the 1-206
statute of frauds would be enforceable up to $5,000 in damages. 63
Moreover, the difficulty of proving partial performance in foreign
exchange transactions 170 reduces the likelihood that a party could
take advantage of the provision in any case.
C. The Confirmations' Effect on the Terms of the Contract
1. The Oral Contract
Under both the common law and the U.C.C., the sample trans-
action described in Section III of this Note, like most foreign ex-
change transactions, rests on an oral contract. The nature of the
foreign exchange market dictates that the parties to the transac-
tion are bound as soon as they make a deal over the telephone. In
a spot transaction the bank and the customer or other bank may
take steps to effect payment 17 1 or enter into a second transaction
165. See supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
168. See Note, The Uniform Commercial Code, Section 1-206-A New Departure in
the Statute of Frauds?, 70 YALE L.J. 603, 609-10 (1961).
169. The natural reading of the section is that the $5,000 figure merely limits the ex-
tent to which the courts will enforce the contract. See Olympic Junior, Inc. v. David Crystal,
Inc., 463 F.2d 1141, 1145 (3d Cir. 1972) (1-206 "would be no bar to enforcement of the
contract to the extent of $5,000, regardless of the value of the property to be sold under the
contract"). But see Cohn, Invers & Co. v. Gross, 56 Misc. 2d 491, 289 N.Y.S.2d 301 (Sup. Ct.
1968).
170. See supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
171. See J. HEYwooD, supra note 9, at 11-12.
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to cover exposure that the previous transaction created 2 before
the parties send confirmations of the deal. In a forward transac-
tion, to cover their exposure the parties may match the deal with
its reverse in a second transaction before they exchange any writ-
ten forms of the agreement.'7 3 If a bank must wait from the time
the parties agree upon a rate until they exchange written confirma-
tions to determine whether it must cover the transaction, the bank
could suffer considerable losses from rate fluctuations.'74
Although foreign exchange contracts often rest upon telephone
conversations,17 5 sometimes one side may argue that because the
parties later prepared written confirmations they had not intended
to bind themselves until they had reduced the terms to a writing,
signed it, and exchanged copies. In Schwartz v. Greenberg7 6 two
parties met to negotiate a sale of stock, signed individual counter-
parts of a written proposed contract, but did not exchange the
counterparts because the plaintiff refused to accept an uncertified
check as payment.'7 The next day the defendant refused to com-
plete the transaction, and the plaintiff sued for breach of con-
tract. ' 78 The New York Court of Appeals found "no evidence of an
intention of the parties to be bound by any mere oral understand-
ing," and held that "the parties did not intend to be bound until a
written agreement had been signed and delivered. 17' The court
found that since the parties had not exchanged the signed counter-
parts of the proposed contract, no actual agreement existed upon
which to sue. This argument in the foreign exchange context, how-
ever, would create a swearing contest, that the party who claimed
that no contract existed would have difficulty winning because of
the conventions of the foreign exchange market.
172. See Revey, supra note 2, at 37-38.
173. J. HEYWOOD, supra note 9, at 89.
174. See Revey, supra note 2, at 37-38.
175. Section 2-204(1) states that "[a] contract for sale of goods may be made in any
manner sufficient to show agreement. .. ." U.C.C. § 2-204(1). The Official Comment to § 2-
204 observes that the provision "continues without change the basic policy of recognizing
any manner of expression of agreement, oral, written or otherwise." Id. § 2-204 official com-
ment. See 3 S. WILLISTON, supra nQte 141, § 82A for a discussion of the common-law recog-
nition of telephone contracts.
176. 304 N.Y. 250, 107 N.E.2d 65 (1952).
177. Id. at 253, 107 N.E.2d at 66.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 254, 107 N.E.2d at 67.
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2. Confirmations of the Oral Contract and the Parol Evidence
Rule
At the conclusion of a foreign exchange transaction a court
could examine two sources of evidence to ascertain the agreed
terms of the contract. First, the parties could testify about the oral
contract terms that they agreed upon in their telephone conversa-
tion. Second, the parties could introduce their written confirma-
tions of that oral contract. Assuming the availability of these con-
firmations, however, the court might face some difficult evidentiary
decisions. Should the court allow testimony by one of the parties
that the terms agreed upon over the telephone do not appear in
the confirmations, or that certain terms which appear in the confir-
mations differ from those originally agreed upon? The parol evi-
dence rule governs these decisions, and again the question of the
applicability of Article 2 is particularly significant. The court's de-
cision under the common-law parol evidence rule very well might
differ from a decision under the Article 2 rule. This Note compares
various common-law interpretations of the parol evidence rule with
the Article 2 rule and concludes that courts should apply the Arti-
cle 2 provision by analogy not only because of its greater clarity
and simplicity, but also because of its better-reasoned treatment of
written confirmations of oral contracts.
a. The Common-Law Parol Evidence Rule
The parol evidence rule generally prohibits the introduction of
extrinsic evidence that conflicts with a writing or any expression
that the parties intend as the final expression of their agree-
ment.180 A writing that expresses the parties' final agreement is an
integrated writing. 81 No evidence is admissible that contradicts
the integrated portions of a completely or partially integrated writ-
180. Professor John Murray explains the rule as follows:
[I]f the parties to a transaction have embodied that transaction either in whole or
in part, in a single memorial, such as a writing or writings, and if they have come to
regard that memorial as the final expression of their intentions as a whole, or of a part
thereof, then all other utterances that have taken place in connection with that trans-
action, prior to or contemporaneous with the making of the memorial, are immaterial
for the purpose of determining what the terms of the transaction are or at least so
much of it as is embodied in the memorial. Reduced to its simplest terms, this is a
statement of the usual principle of the substantive law of contracts that, if the parties
so intend, their final expression will prevail over any antecedent expression of
agreement.
J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 105, at 227 (2d rev. ed. 1974) (footnotes omitted).
181. Id. at 228-29; 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 141, § 633, at 1010.
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ing. 182 If a writing is only partially integrated, the parties intended
it as the final expression of only a portion of their agreement,18 3
and extrinsic evidence of additional terms that are not inconsistent
with the integrated portion may be admissible.18 4
The obvious threshold question in the foreign exchange con-
text is whether the written confirmations constitute an integration
of the agreement. An integrated writing will prohibit consideration
of evidence even of a prior agreement.185 Thus, if a court finds that
a written confirmation of a sale of 50,000 French francs is an inte-
gration of the agreement, a party may not introduce evidence of
the oral agreement that would vary the written version. Courts and
commentators, however, disagree about how a court should deter-
mine whether a writing is integrated. Unless the writing itself indi-
cates that it does or does not represent the final and definite ex-
pression of the parties' agreement, a court must sift through a
variety of suggested tests for determining integration.8 8 A party to
a telephone foreign exchange transaction rarely will intend to be
182. J. MURRAY, supra note 180, § 106, at 229; 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 141, § 633,
at 1014.
183. J. MURRAY, supra note 180, § 104, at 226; 4 S. WILSTON, supra note 141, § 636,
at 1035.
184. Id.
185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 215 (1981).
186. Professor Murray notes that although all courts and commentators agree that the
basic issue is the "intention of the parties," they disagree on how to determine that inten-
tion. J. MURRAY, supra note 180, § 106, at 229. For example, Murray describes Professor
Williston's test, which focuses
not on whether the extrinsic agreement was in fact made, but, whether reasonable par-
ties, situated as were the parties to this contract, would have naturally and normally
included the extrinsic matter in the writing. If parties might naturally form a separate
agreement as to such extrinsic matter, the writing was not integrated as to that matter.
Id. at 231 (citing 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 141, §§ 638-39). Murray compares this test to
that of Professor Corbin who
insists upon a test which would have the trial judge (in most cases) consider the extrin-
sic evidence for two purposes: (1) to determine whether there is "respectable" evidence
to show that the antecedent agreement was made, and (2) to determine whether such
an antecedent agreement has or has not been discharged by the subsequent writing
which one of the parties contends is the sole repository of the agreement.
J. MURRAY, supra note 180, § 106, at 231 (citing 3 A. CORBIN, CORBN ON CONTRACTS § 582
(1960)) (footnotes omitted). Finally, Murray manages to identify a trend in the confused
case law:
The myriad approaches to the parol evidence rule problem suggested by the writers,
the new Restatement and the [Uniform Commercial] Code are reflected in the case law
which has been generally ineffective in articulating a workable rationale though the
results of the cases may not be viscerally unacceptable. There is a movement toward a
Corbin position and away from a Williston position evident in the case law, probably
because the reasons underlying the parol rule are no longer compelling.
J. MURRAY, supra note 180, § 107, at 235-36 (footnote omitted).
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bound solely by the terms of a confirmation sent by the other
party. The parties merely rely on the confirmations to ensure that
no misunderstanding exists about the terms of the transaction to
which they agreed over the telephone. Professor Wigmore suggests
that a writing intended "merely to furnish an aid to the writer's
recollection or a written admission for the other party's satisfac-
tion" is not an integration. 187 Furthermore, several cases have held
that a memorandum upon which the parties rely to remove a con-
tract from the statute of frauds is not integrated and, hence, not
subject to the parol evidence rule.8 8 In Nathan v. Spector'8 9 the
court admitted parol evidence showing that a memorandum of a
sale of real property did not contain all of the essential terms of
the contract that the applicable statute of frauds required. The
writing failed to satisfy the statute, and the court held the contract
unenforceable.190 The more liberal writing requirements under the
U.C.C. statute of frauds, which arguably covers foreign exchange
transactions likely will prevent this harsh consequence. 19' Spector,
however, offers clear authority for an argument that a mere memo-
randum or confirmation of a contract is not an integration. In that
case the court ruled expressly that the memorandum of sale was
not an integration; had it found otherwise, it might not have ad-
mitted the parol evidence that rendered the contract
unenforceable.
Since the parties' confirmations in a foreign exchange transac-
tion would not constitute an integration, a court would admit testi-
mony concerning the original oral agreement. In a genuine dispute
the parties probably would tell conflicting versions of what terms
they agreed upon over the telephone. If one party introduced a
confirmation, it would sway the fact-finder only if it conflicted with
the other party's testimony.1 92 If both parties introduced confirma-
tions and each writing corroborated its respective party's testi-
mony, the fact-finder would not find either particularly helpful. If,
187. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2429, at 95-96 (3d ed. 1940).
188. See, e.g., Donald Friedman & Co. v. Newman, 255 N.Y. 340, 174 N.E. 703 (1931);
N.E.D. Holding Co. v. McKinley, 246 N.Y. 40, 157 N.E. 923 (1927); Nathan v. Spector, 281
A.D. 451, 120 N.Y.S.2d 358 (1953); Duncan v. WohI, South & Co., 201 A.D. 737, 195 N.Y.S.
381 (1922); Southern States Dev. Co. v. Robinson, 494 S.W.2d 777 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972).
But see Moran v. Thurman-Davis Grain Co., 226 S.W. 84 (1920).
189. 281 A.D. 451, 120 N.Y.S.2d 358 (1953).
190. Id. at 454, 120 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
191. See supra notes 145-69 and accompanying text.
192. For a discussion of whether the different term might modify the contract, see
infra notes 206-08 and accompanying text.
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however, both parties' confirmations agreed on the disputed terms,
the evidence would be almost conclusive that the testimony pro-
vided by the confirmations was accurate. Yet under the common
law, even if the two confirmations agreed on the disputed terms,
the court nevertheless must admit evidence that the parties origi-
nally agreed to different terms. Since both parties rarely would
prepare their confirmations with identical but incorrect terms, this
admission of conflicting testimony would be a waste of the court's
time.193
b. The Article 2 Parol Evidence Rule
The Article 2 parol evidence rule, codified at section 2-202,194
193. In the unlikely event that both parties make identical mistakes in recording their
agreement, they could argue for reformation of the confirmations under the equitable doc-
trine of "mistake." Mistake as applied to written confirmations of an oral contract would be
characterized as "an expression of agreement which differs from the agreement intended by
the parties." 13 S. WILLISTON, supra note 141, § 1541, at 67.
New York courts, however, twice have refused to allow reformation of written confirma-
tions that the parties relied upon to remove oral contracts from the statute of frauds. See
Donald Friedman & Co. v. Newman, 255 N.Y. 340, 174 N.E. 703 (1931); Kobre v. Instru-
ment Systems Corp., 54 A.D.2d 625, 387 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1976), afi'd, 43 N.Y.2d 862, 374
N.E.2d 131, 403 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1978). These New York cases are distinguishable from the
foreign exchange situations in which the applicable statute of frauds would be U.C.C. § 1-
206 or perhaps U.C.C. § 2-201. See supra part IV(B). The court in Friedman noted that the
applicable statute of frauds in that case, 1909 N.Y. LAWS ch. 45 (repealed 1964), required
that a memorandum "shall completely evidence the contract which the parties made." 255
N.Y. at 343, 184 N.E. at 704 (quoting Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 216 N.Y. 310,
314, 110 N.E. 619, 620 (1915)). The Kobre court applied the statute of frauds as codified in
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-701 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1982) and stated that the "memo-
randum must contain substantially the whole agreement and all its material terms and con-
ditions. . . ." 54 A.D.2d at 626, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 618-19 (quoting Mentz v. Newwitter, 122
N.Y. 491, 497, 25 N.E. 1044, 1046 (1890)). While these New York cases were governed by
statutes of frauds which required that confirmatory memoranda express entirely the terms
of a contract, the U.C.C. statutes of frauds require only that the memoranda "afford a basis
for believing that the offered oral evidence rests on a real transaction." U.C.C. § 2-201 offi-
cial comment 1 (1978). Section 2-201(1) declares that "[a] writing is not insufficient because
it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon," id. at § 2-201(1), and the language of § 1-
206 implies that the same policy applies in that section. See supra notes 160-62 and accom-
panying text. Thus, a reformation under the U.C.C. would not give a confirmation "an effect
forbidden by the statute," 255 N.Y. at 347, 174 N.E. at 705, and, therefore, a court should
allow it. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1978) (providing that the doctrine of mistake applies under the
U.C.C.). See also Luria Bros. & Co. v. Pielet Bros. Scrap Iron & Metal, 600 F.2d 103 (7th
Cir. 1979) (allowing reformation of memorandum under § 2-201).
194. Section 2-202 provides:
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or
which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression
of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be con-
tradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement
but may be explained or supplemented
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simplifies considerably the judicial task of interpreting contracts
with confirmations. Like the common law, section 2-202 properly
allows oral evidence of conflicting terms if only one confirmation
exists, except in the unlikely event that the confirmation is inte-
grated.19 5 If both parties issue confirmations that agree on certain
terms, section 2-202 construes the writings as integrated with re-
spect to their common terms without requiring any such determi-
nation by the court."9" Extrinsic evidence that conflicts with the
terms common to both confirmations is inadmissible. 197
Courts should apply this far more sensible treatment of confir-
mations analogously to foreign exchange transactions. 98 The re-
mainder of section 2-202 parallels the common law, except that
section 2-202 emphasizes construing terms by "course of dealing or
usage of trade" or "by course of performance,"199 and rejects any
presumption that an integrated writing is final on "all the matters
agreed upon. 20 0 A finding of partial integration would allow evi-
dence of "consistent additional terms '20 1 under section 2-202, just
as it would at common law. Furthermore, application of this sec-
tion by analogy to foreign exchange contracts would provide the
courts with the additional advantage of a consistent starting point,
as described in the Official Comment to 2-202, for determining par-
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205) or by course of performance
(Section 2-208); and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing to
have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the
agreement.
U.C.C. § 2-202 (1978).
195. Some courts have misapplied U.C.C. § 2-201(2), which provides that a single con-
firmation will satisfy the statute of frauds if the other party does not send notice of objec-
tion, by incorporating the terms of the confirmation into the contract without first applying
the § 2-207 materiality test. See infra notes 215-16 and accompanying text. See, e.g.,
Campanelli v. Conservas Altamira, S.A., 477 P.2d 870 (Nev. 1970); 3 R. DUESENBERG & L.
KING, SALES AND BULK TRANSFERS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (MB) § 3.09, at
3-98 to 3-99 (1982).
196. See, e.g., Luria Bros. & Co. v. Pielet Bros. Scrap Iron & Metal, 600 F.2d 103 (7th
Cir. 1979).
197. For a discussion of the possibility of reformation because of mutual mistake in
recording the terms, see supra note 193.
198. Courts have applied U.C.C. § 2-202 to transactions in "nongoods" in the following
cases: Stern & Co. v. State Loan & Finance Corp., 238 F. Supp. 901, 911 (D. Del. 1965) (sale
of stock); Interstate Indus. Uniform Rental Serv., Inc. v. F.R. Lepage Bakery, Inc., 413 A.2d
516, 522 (Me. 1980) (contract for goods and services); Hunt Foods & Indus., Inc. v. Doliner,
26 A.D.2d 41, 42-43, 270 N.Y.S.2d 937, 939-40 (1966) (sale of stock).
199. U.C.C. § 2-202(a) (1978).
200. Id. § 2-202 official comment 1(a).
201. Id. § 2-202(b).
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3. Confirmations of the Oral Contract and the "Battle of the
Forms"
a. The Common Law
At common law, the "mirror image rule" requires that an ac-
ceptance not vary the terms of an offer if the acceptance is to be
effective.2 0 A purported acceptance that does not match the offer
acts as a counteroffer, which the original offeror must accept to
form a contract.' °0 This common-law doctrine, however, makes no
provision for confirmatory memoranda of prior contracts. Thus, if
the parties to a foreign exchange transaction send conflicting con-
firmations, a court faced with establishing the terms of the con-
tract would admit evidence of the prior oral agreement in addition
to the confirmations.20 5 In this manner, the fact-finder could
choose between the terms suggested in oral testimony and those
recorded in the two differing confirmations. This process could
produce results that are unpredictable and confusing to lawyers,
courts, and parties to these transactions.
Courts face a similar problem if the parties exchange confir-
mations and a term in one confirmation is absent from the other or
conflicts with a term in the original agreement. Again, the fact-
finder would have to determine whether the term is a part of the
contract by considering evidence of the oral agreement in addition
to the confirmations. If the court determines that the original
agreement did not include the term or included a conflicting term,
the court would construe it as an "offer" to modify the already-
existing contract.206 The court will modify the contract to include
the term if the other party assents to or "accepts" the offer of
modification.0 The party's silence will operate as acceptance if he
enjoys the benefits of that modification or if he has indicated
somehow that his silence signifies an acceptance.208 Thus, a party
202. The Official Comment provides, "If the additional terms are such that, if agreed
upon, they would certainly have been included in the document in the view of the court,
then evidence of their alleged making must be kept from the trier of fact." Id. § 2-202
official comment 3.
203. J. MURRAY, supra note 180, § 54, at 111.
204. Id.
205. This conclusion assumes, of course, that the confirmations do not integrate the
agreement. See supra notes 185-91 and accompanying text.
206. See, e.g., Suitter v. Thompson, 225 Or. 614, 358 P.2d 267 (1960).
207. Id.
208. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 69 comment a. See Suitter v. Thompson,
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who receives a confirmation that includes a different or additional
term should protect himself by notifying the other party either
that he accepts or rejects that term.
Yet, the problems of the mirror image rule still may persist
because parties may use standard confirmation forms that differ
and may not notice inconsistent or additional terms.20 9 Further-
more, a party may attempt to employ the "last shot"210 advantage
by adding a favorable term in his confirmation and then trying to
show somehow that the other party assented to it. Clearly, applica-
tion of common-law rules to foreign exchange transactions would
subject the parties, their lawyers, and the courts to the infamous
problems of the "battle of the forms. ' 2l
b. Section 2-207
The purpose of section 2-207 is to solve the problems that the
mirror image rule creates. 2 Although often criticized as poorly
drafted, 13 the section could be applied appropriately by analogy in
the foreign exchange context because it offers explicit guidelines
for treatment of confirmations of prior oral contracts. 4
225 Or. 614, 358 P.2d 267 (1960).
209. Davenport, How to Handle Sales of Goods: the Problem of Conflicting Purchase
Orders and Acceptances and New Concepts in Contract Law, 19 Bus. LAW. 75, 78 (1963).
210. J. MuRRAY, supra note 180, § 54, at 113.
211. Id.
212. Section 2-207 provides:
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation
which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states
terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is
expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the con-
tract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within a rea-
sonable time after notice of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is suffi-
cient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not other-
wise establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular contract consist of
those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any supplemen-
tary terms incorporated under any other provisions of this Act.
U.C.C. § 2-207 (1978).
213. The Kansas Supreme Court, for example, has described § 2-207 as a "murky bit
of prose." Southwest Eng'g Co. v. Martin Tractor Co., 205 Kan. 684, 694, 473 P.2d 18, 25
(1970).
214. The Official Comment explains the scope of § 2-207:
This section is intended to deal with two typical situations. The one is the written
confirmation, where an agreement has been reached either orally or by informal corre-
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Section 2-207 directly solves the problem of the term that ap-
pears in the confirmation but not in the original agreement. It pro-
vides that "[t]he additional terms are to be construed as proposals
for addition to the contract."2115 Although this provision is the same
as at common law, its guidelines for adding terms to the contract
simplify considerably the common-law rules and reduce the danger
of the "last shot." If the parties are merchants," 6 "such terms be-
come part of the contract unless . . . they materially alter it...
or... notification of objection to them has already been given or
is given within a reasonable time after notice of them is
received."21 7
Although the requirement that a party expressly agree to the
addition of a term that materially alters the contract offers little
guidance on what the courts will or will not construe as a material
alteration, at least the provision gives the courts a mandate to
soften the blow of the "last shot." The arbitration term is the most
frequently litigated example of a term that parties attempt to add,
and courts generally deem the provision sufficiently "material" to
prevent its inclusion in the contract. 18
Notwithstanding this protection against material alteration,
parties must read confirmations carefully to protect themselves
from the addition of unfavorable terms that a court might not con-
sider material. The "reasonable time" that a party has to object to
additional terms begins as soon as the confirmation arrives. 1 9
spondence between the parties and is followed by one or both of the parties sending
formal memoranda embodying the terms so far as agreed upon and adding terms not
discussed. The other situation is offer and acceptance ...
U.C.C. § 2-207 official comment 1 (1978).
215. Id. § 2-207(2).
216. See supra note 151. In the unlikely event that the two parties are not merchants
for purposes of § 2-207, the common law will determine whether the terms will become part
of the contract. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1978).
217. U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (1978). Subsection (a) of § 2-207(2), which prevents the addi-
tional terms from becoming part of the contract if "the offer expressly limits acceptance to
the terms of the offer," id. § 2-207(a), simply is inappropriate in the context of confirma-
tions to an already existing contract, see American Parts Co. v. Arbitration Ass'n, 8 Mich.
App. 156, 154 N.W.2d 5 (1967); 3 R. DUESENnERG & L. KING, supra note 195, § 3.08, at 3-92
to 3-93.
218. See, e.g., Lounge-A-Round v. G.C.M. Mills, Inc., 109 Cal. App. 3d 190, 166 Cal.
Rptr. 920 (1980); American Parts Co. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 8 Mich App. 156, 154
N.W.2d 5 (1967); In re Marlene Indus. Corp. v. Carnac Textiles, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 327, 380
N.E.2d 239, 408 N.Y.S.2d 410 (1978); In re Tunis Mfg. Corp., 40 A.D.2d 664, 337 N.Y.S.2d
150 (1972); Application of Doughboy Indus., Inc., 17 A.D.2d 216, 233 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1962).
219. Section 1-201(27) explains "notice" as follows:
Notice, knowledge or a notice or notification received by an organization is effec-
tive for a particular transaction from the time when it is brought to the attention of the
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Moreover, given the volatility of exchange rates, a "reasonable
time" for purposes of the foreign exchange industry likely will be
shorter than in most industries.2 0
Section 2-207 does not resolve the problem of different terms
as clearly as it does that of additional terms because it does not
expressly provide that different terms be treated as proposals for
addition to the contract. The Official Comment to section 2-207,
however, states that "[w]hether or not additional or different
terms will become part of the agreement depends upon the provi-
sions of subsection (2). ' ' ' Courts are split on this question.2 2 The
better solution is to interpret section 2-207(2) to include different
terms. In the case of two confirmations whose terms conflict, the
Official Comment to section 2-207 provides a simple resolution
that further supports this view: "Where clauses on confirming
forms sent by both parties conflict each party must be assumed to
object to a clause of the other conflicting with one on the confirma-
tion sent by himself. '223 The drafters, then, intended that differing
confirmations be within the ambit of the section 2-207(2)(c) objec-
tion provision.2 2 4 This interpretation eases considerably the task of
a court faced with this situation. The court need look only to the
original contract and the terms on which the confirmations agree
to construe the agreement, without considering additional terms.225
individual conducting that transaction, and in any event from the time when it would
have been brought to his attention if the organization had exercised due diligence. An
organization exercises due diligence if it maintains reasonable routines for communicat-
ing significant information to the person conducting the transaction and there is rea-
sonable compliance with the routines. Due diligence does not require an individual act-
ing for the organization to communicate information unless such communication is part
of his regular duties or unless he has reason to know of the transaction and that the
transaction would be materially affected by the information.
U.C.C. § 1-201(27) (1978). Thus, the organization should bring a confirmation to the atten-
tion of the appropriate officer immediately upon its arrival.
220. "What is a reasonable time for taking any action depends on the nature, purpose
and circumstances of such action." U.C.C. § 1-204(2) (1978). In Lish v. Compton, 547 P.2d
223 (Utah 1976), the court held that 12 days was not a reasonable time for objection to a
written memorandum under § 2-201 because of the fluctuations of the wheat market.
221. U.C.C. § 2-207 official comment 3 (1978).
222. Compare, e.g., American Parts Co. v. Arbitration Ass'n, 8 Mich. App. 156, 154
N.W.2d 5 (1967) (§ 2-207(2) applies only to additional terms) with Steiner v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 90, 569 P.2d 751, 141 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1977) (§ 2-207(2) applies both to
additional and different terms).
223. U.C.C. § 2-207 official comment 6 (1978).
224. Official Comment 6 explains further that conflicting confirmations "do not be-
come a part of the contract" because the conflict satisfies "the requirement that there be
notice of objection which is found in subsection (2)." Id. § 2-207 official comment 6.
225. The Official Comment relies on the § 2-202 parol evidence rule's treatment of con-
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When faced with only one confirmation form that includes a
term different from its counterpart in the oral agreement, a court
should treat the original contract term as an objection which "has
already been given"22 to the different term under section 2-
207(2)(c). This result is appropriate, for the parties have entered
into a binding contract that they can change only through express
consent. Unfortunately, however, since one cannot assume that a
court will follow this reasoning, a party who receives a confirma-
tion changing the terms of the original agreement should always
notify the other party in writing of his objection to the different
terms to assure himself of protection.
V. CONCLUSION
Time is precious and trust indispensible in the burgeoning
foreign exchange market. Deals must be made now, often over the
telephone, and the details of checking the terms of those deals
against the other parties' understanding of them must wait. The
prospect of continued growth in foreign exchange increases the
likelihood of litigation arising from the necessarily rapid and ab-
breviated system employed by banks and their customers of re-
cording the terms of these transactions.
Although one may argue that Article 2 of the U.C.C. applies to
these transactions, closer examination reveals that the statute is
not applicable since the transactions actually are sales of choses in
action. Thus, courts probably will apply the more lenient statute of
frauds provision of section 1-206 to these transactions rather than
section 2-201. Traditional confirmation forms should satisfy the
statute, and a party should demand that the other party send a
confirmation if he does not offer to do so.
Courts should apply the Article 2 parol evidence rule and the
Article 2 provision for the battle of the forms by analogy to foreign
exchange transactions. Because these sections specifically address
confirmations of prior oral contracts, their application would sim-
plify considerably the court's task of construing these agreements
and would provide more consistent and appropriate results.
MICHAEL LATHAM MANIRE
firmations that agree, see supra note 194, in explaining what terms a court should include in
the contract- "The contract then consists of the terms originally expressly agreed to, terms
on which the confirmations agree, and terms supplied by this Act, including subsection (2)."
U.C.C. § 2-207 official comment 6.
226. U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(c) (1978).
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